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Abstract
This paper discusses the regulatory requirement (Basel Committee, ECB-SSM and EBA)
to measure financial institutions’ major risks, for instance Market, Credit and Operational,
regarding the choice of the risk measures, the choice of the distributions used to model them
and the level of confidence. We highlight and illustrate the paradoxes and the issues observed
implementing an approach over another and the inconsistencies between the methodologies
suggested and the goal to achieve. This paper make some recommendations to the supervisor
and proposes alternative procedures to measure the risks.2
Key words: Risk measures - Sub-additivity - Level of confidence - Extreme value distri-
butions - Financial regulation
1Disclaimer: The opinions, ideas and approaches expressed or presented are those of the authors and do not
necessarily reflect Santander’s position. As a result, Santander cannot be held responsible for them.
2This paper has been written in a very particular period of time as most regulatory papers written in the past
20 years are currently being questioned by both practitioners and regulators themselves. Some distress or disarray
has been observed among risk managers as most models required by the regulation were not consistent with their
own objective of risk management. The enlightenment brought by this paper is based on an academic analysis of
the issues engendered by some pieces of regulation and it has not for purpose to create any sort of polemic.
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1 Introduction
The ECB-SSM 3, the EBA 4 and the Basel Committee are currently reviewing the methodological
framework of risk modelling. In this paper, we analyse some of the issues observed measuring
the risks as prescribed that would be useful to address in the future regulatory documents.
1.1 Problematic
During the current crisis, the failure of models and the lack of capture of extreme exposures led
regulators to change the way risks were measured either by requiring financial institutions to use
particular families of distributions (Gaussian (BCBS (2005)), sub-exponantial (EBA (2014b))),
either by changing the way dependencies were captured (EBA (2014b)) or suggesting switching
from the VaR (Value-at-Risk)5 to sub-additive risk measures like the ES (Expected Shorfall)6
(BCBS (2013)). Indeed, risk modelling had played a major role during the crisis which began in
2008 either as catalysts or triggers. The latest changes proposed by the authorities have been
motivated by the will to come closer to the reality of the financial markets.
Before capturing dependencies, the choice of the probability distributions used to model the risks
and their associated measures are key points for practitioners and regulators. From a technical
point of view, it is now accepted that the most relevant piece of information for risk managers
is contained in the tails of the distributions characterising the risk factors they are willing to
control. Thus it appears sensible that regulators, following theoretical and empirical studies and
evolution of the risks associated to markets, financial products and actors behaviours adjust
3European Central Bank - Single Supervisor Mechanism
4European Banking Authority
5Given a confidence level p ∈ [0, 1], the VaR associated to a random variable X is given by the smallest number
x such that the probability that X exceeds x is not larger than (1− p)
V aR(1−p)% = inf(x ∈ R : P (X > x) ≤ (1− p)). (1.1)
6For a given p in [0, 1], η the V aR(1−p)%, and X a random variable which represents losses during a prespecified
period (such as a day, a week, or some other chosen time period) then,
ES(1−p)% = E(X|X > η). (1.2)
2
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their requirements. Nevertheless analysing in details these requests, we note - inside the guide-
lines - some confusions and misleading interpretations which cannot help to robustly evaluate
and control these risks in financial institutions and also do not permit constructive exchanges
between regulators and practitioners in order to reach the stability objective of the financial
industry.
Thus, the purpose of this paper is to discuss some parts of the methodological framework pro-
posed for risk modelling by the regulators and its evolution from 1995 to 2015, focusing on
their strong incentive to use: (i) specific distributions to characterise the risks, (ii) specific risk
measures, (iii) specific associated confidence level, and to apply these strategies independently
from each others. We illustrate in the following that distributions, risk measures and confidence
levels are three facets of a single object and are therefore indivisible. Thus, we argue that the
approaches proposed by the regulators in the guidelines focusing on risk modelling engender a
bias (positive or negative) in the computation of the risks, and consequently a distortion in the
corresponding capital requirements, as soon as the problem of the measurement is not being
dealt with in its globality.
Some of the following points are mainly addressed in this paper:
1. Is the choice of a particular risk measure ensures conservativeness?
2. What is the impact of the choice of a particular distribution on the associated risk measure?
3. For a single kind of risk: given a risk measure, what choice of the confidence level p is
really appropriate?
4. When we use a V aRp measure, for which distributions is the sub-additivity7 property
fulfiled as soon as we consider several risk factors?
7A coherent risk measure is a function ρ : L∞ → R:
• Monotonicity:If X1, X2 ∈ L and X1 ≤ X2 then ρ(X1) ≤ ρ(X2)
• Sub-additivity: If X1, X2 ∈ L then ρ(X1 +X2) ≤ ρ(X1) + ρ(X2)
• Positive homogeneity: If λ ≥ 0 and X ∈ L then ρ(λX) = λρ(X)
• Translation invariance: ∀k ∈ R, ρ(X + k) = ρ(X)− k
3
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5. Given that each risk type is modelled considering different distributions and using different
p-s, how can the sub-additivity criterion be fulfilled?
1.2 Questions raised by Regulatory proposals
For three categories of risks (market, credit8 and operational), regulatory proposals regarding the
choice of the distributions, the risk measures and the associated confidence level p are analysed.
Issues related to their implementation have been highlighted in the following.
1.2.1 Market risks
1 - In the BCBS (1995) document, it is explicitly written:"The Committee has examined carefully
how banks’ value-at-risk measures based on the parameters described above can be converted
into a capital requirement that appropriately reflects the prudential concerns of supervisors. One
of the problems of recognising banks’ value-at-risk measures as an appropriate capital charge is
that the assessments are based on historical data and that, even under a 99% confidence inter-
val, extreme market conditions are excluded. The Committee does not believe that a ten-day
value-at-risk measure provides sufficient comfort for the measurement of capital for a number
of reasons, which include: the past is not always a good guide to the future; the assumptions
about statistical "normality" built into some models may not be justified, i.e. there may be "fat
tails" in the distribution curve; the correlations assumed in the model may prove to be incorrect;
market liquidity may become inadequate to close out positions.”
These proposals suggest several remarks concerning various very different concepts.
• First, the regulator says that the choice of the VaR as the risk measure excludes to take
into account extreme events. This statement is not correct as the choice of the VaR is
not the issue, it is the choice of the underlying distribution with which the associated
quantile is evaluated that determines if the extreme events are captured or not. This
question actually implied a second question about what is an extreme event as answering
this question would suppose a complete information set.
• Second, the regulator discusses the inadequacy of using a "ten-day value at risk...." for the
8Credit Value Adjustment and Wrong Way Risk Included (BCBS (2011a))
4
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measurement of the capital. Indeed, it is generally an error to use "the ten-day value at
risk" but the reasons evoked by the regulators are sources of confusion. The errors found
their origins in two main issues, the choice of the model by the practitioners (independence
between the risk factors) on the first hand, and the implied Gaussian behaviour of the risk
models, on the other hand. It would be more appropriate from a practical point of view
to invite practitioners to work in a more robust way investigating both the properties and
the patterns of their data: (i) Are they independent or not? (ii) Whatever the answer
to this first question, what is the most appropriate model (according to adequacy, con-
servativeness, or some other criteria)? (iii) How to capture the dependencies (not only
between two risk factors using the concept of correlation which assumes also that there is
some linearity between the risk factors, but a more general dependence architecture)? (iv)
What is "the" distribution characterising the data set (it can be Gaussian, fat tailed, thin
tailed, asymmetric, symmetric, multimodal etc....)? (v) How to justify the choice of the
probability distribution they retain?
• Third, the question of the choice of the information set is crucial, but saying that the
use of historical data is "not a good way to work" is particularly dangerous. Indeed, the
historical data set is the only original information set available for the modeler. Concerning
this information set, a more relevant question is to decide the period the modeler has to use
and the length of this period. Thus, there is a huge mis-understanding from the regulator
concerning the information set the practitioners have to use : "good" data sets do not exist.
• Fourth, when regulators said that modellers need to capture market liquidity with the
information set, it was only rhetorical. As soon as a market is illiquid it creates a systemic
risk which is another problem, consequently the question of the definition of liquidity risk
should be raised. Why did the regulator introduce this issue in 1995? A debate is largely
opened on the concept and even in 2015, to our knowledge, it does not emerge a "correct"
and useful definition for this kind of risk in the literature, as the liquidity coverage ratio
(LCR) supposed to evaluate the buffer covering the risk of being illiquid converges to zero
as soon as the market tends to dry up. Note that we will not address this issue in the
following as it is out of scope of this paper, but it was worth mentioning it with respect
to the question of the data set quality.
5
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2 - In Interpretive Issues with respect to the revisions to the market risk framework in November
2011, Page 8, paragraph 718 (xciii) (BCBS (2011b)) regarding the incremental risk capital, the
Basel Committee stipulates that "in combination with the relevant rules on IRC, it is accepted
that banks model issuer interdependence assuming multivariate normal distributions or normal
copula (e.g. between asset values, credit spreads or default times) or must they show that such
model assumptions do not underestimate risk?".
This proposal is surprising and very restrictive looking at the modelling of dependencies between
the risk factors. Indeed the Gaussian copula takes the same information in both tails (it does not
consider that asymmetry between information sets can exist). Furthermore, it does not consider
the importance of fat tails, which is not consistent with the behaviour of most risks observed
on financial markets (especially during the crisis). Since 2011, a lot of research using copula
(like the Archimeadean copula for instance) and vines which take asymmetrical behavior and
information in the tails has been conducted. This remark, is interesting as a Gaussian copula
structure correspond to the inverse of a multivariate Gaussian distribution. We see that once
again the world seems Gaussian regulatory speaking. We are quickly illustrating the issue below,
though we will see that it is not helping addressing issues related to risk measures.
3 - Nevertheless the regulator in the same document states (page 9): "The onus is on the bank to
justify the modelling choices and their impact to the national supervisor. Normal distributions
or normal copula may not be assumed uncritically. The impact of such modelling choices must
be analysed in the validation."
One may wonder why regulators propose so restrictive models (Gaussian framework in the pre-
vious paragraph) to say after that they may not be good enough? Why not just giving the
possibility to financial institutions to model the risk factors in the way they consider to be the
best fit, and then rely on an independent validation process to validate their choice. 9
4 - In the Consultative Document concerning the Fundamental review of the trading book (BCBS
(2013)) "A revised market risk framework", October 2013, Page 3, the Basel Committee proposes
9We recall that the idea of a floor on some metrics (capital, etc.) has been mentioned and may also be relevant.
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to move from Value-at-Risk (VaR) to Expected Shortfall (ES) as "a number of weaknesses have
been identified with using VaR for determining regulatory capital requirements, including its
inability to capture “tail risk”". The ES measures the riskiness of a position by considering both
the size and the likelihood of losses above a certain confidence level. The Committee has agreed
to use a 97.5th ES for the internal models-based approach and has also used that approach to
calibrate capital requirements under the revised market risk standardised approach.
With this more recent document it appears that the regulator thinks that the use of the ES
instead of the VaR risk would permit to capture the most relevant information to measure the
risks. This is not necessarily true as it still depends on the choice of the distributions used for the
computation of this ES. Nevertheless, we know that this last measure is more interesting than
the VaR as considering the same distribution it provides a better information concerning the
amplitude of the risk, but if the fitted distribution is inappropriate the problem of capture of the
extreme events remains the same. Besides, the choice of the level of confidence, for instance 97.5
is also arbitrary (this point has been illustrated in the next Section). Why does the regulator
move from 99 % (in 1995) to 97,5 % (in 2012)? - Why do not they propose 95% or another value
p?.
1.2.2 Credit Risk and Counterparty Credit Risk
1 - In the International Convergence of Capital Measurement and Capital Standards, November
2005, Page 60 recommendation 71 (BCBS (2005)), the Basel Committee explicitly discusses the
evaluation of the credit risk using an underlying Gaussian distribution along other parameters.
This proposal remains very limited and a dangerous approach, even if some robust works can
be done when practitioners compute the probability of default (PD) (Guégan et al. (2013)),
the loss given default (LGD) and the exposure of default (EAD). Using a Gaussian distribution
even shifted considering the other parameters implies that the essence of the modelled risk has
a Gaussian behaviour. Indeed, the intensity of default is transformed into a Gaussian quantile
and somehow compared to the 99th percentile of the same Gaussian distribution. This is highly
questionable and overly simplistic. What led to that conclusion? How is that possible to be
backtested? This approach is nothing more than a transformed VaR. To the regulators’ credit
7
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this model did not lead (yet) to massive failures, though low default portfolio credit risk mod-
elling is currently being highly questioned.
Another issue that is worth mentioning but not dealt with in this paper is the independence
between PD, LGD and EAD. This is not consitent with the piece of regulation requiering banks
to capture wrong way risk, i.e. the upper tail dependence between PD and EAD (BCBS (2011a)).
2 - In the Article 383(4) of Regulation 575/2013 European Banking Authority - Consultation
Paper - On Draft Regulatory Technical Standards (RTS) on credit valuation adjustment risk
for the determination of a proxy spread and the specification of a limited number of smaller
portfolios, and in the Article 383 of Regulation (EU) 575/2013 Capital Requirements Regula-
tion - CRR, July 2013, Page 7 (EBA (2014a)), it is said "that institutions are permitted (i) to
use a VaR model for the measurement of specific market risk of debt instruments, (ii) to use
an internal Expected Positive Exposure (EPE) model for the calculation of the exposure values
to counterparty credit risk on the majority of their business, but use other methods (Mark-to-
Market Method, Standardised Method or Original Exposures Method) for smaller portfolios".
It appears that these proposals are problematic as some "norms" are defined for banks internal
models even if these models are totally inadequate when we fit them to real data. Nowhere
regulators or experts from regulatory institutions provide the assumptions which justify the use
of such models or such methodology. How can we interpret this absence of justifications? Is
that a political decision? If the answer is yes, then what are the objectives? It seems to be the
will of a "one size fits all" approach to be able to compare banks risk management performance.
Unfortunately, if the model is inadequate, then the quality of the risk management will not be
properly reflected and therefore the outcomes of the model misleading for both the authorities
and the practitioners. Besides, it appears to be a bit despotic and to transfer the burden from
the regulator onto the banks.
The credit value adjustment (CVA) is closely related to the evaluation of derivatives. The as-
sumption is that models used to evaluate derivatives such as Black & Scholes as these models
do not capture the risk of a counterparty defaulting. The CVA in its nature challenges the
8
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use of Gaussian like distributions as it questions the soundness of the risk neutral valuation.
Indeed the risk neutral valuation does not capture the risk of a counterparty to default, there-
fore an adjustment has been created to add a buffer in capital. The expected positive exposure
(EPE) used to evaluate the CVA is quite interesting too, as a symmetrical distribution such as
the Gaussian distribution is used to capture an asymetric exposure (positive) (Gregory (2012)).
This does not seem very sensible. It seems that once again, the regulation implies the use of a
particular distribution even if it is not appropriate except maybe to simplify the calculations.
1.2.3 Operational risks
1 - In their article 312 of Regulation (EU) No 575/2013, June 2014, Page 43, the European
Banking Authority - Consultation Paper - Draft Regulatory Technical Standards on assessment
methodologies for the Advanced Measurement Approaches for operational risk (EBA (2014b))
states that "the competent authority shall verify that an institution pays particular attention
to the positive skewness and leptokurtosis of the data when selecting a severity distribution.
When the data are much dispersed in the tail, empirical curves shall not be used to estimate
the tail region. Sub-exponential distributions shall be used for this purpose unless there exist
exceptional reasons to apply other functions, which shall be in any case properly addressed and
fully justified to prevent undue reduction of the capital figures." In Pages 17-18, "sub-exponential
distributions" are defined as distributions whose right tail decreases slower than the exponential
distribution. The class of sub-exponential distributions includes the lognormal, log-gamma, log-
logistic, generalised Pareto, Burr, and Weibull (with shape parameter < 1) (Guégan and Hassani
(2014)). The Weibull (with shape parameter > 1) and gamma distributions do not belong to
the class of Sub-exponential distributions. Sub-exponential distributions can better represent
the shape of the data in the tail (other than their skewness in the body) by allowing estimates
of parameters that do not depend on the higher order statistical moments".
Comparing the proposal for operational risk modelling (Guégan and Hassani (2009), Guégan and
Hassani (2013b)) with proposals to model other types of risks, we observe that for operational
risks, experts thinking is ahead, however, some questions should be raised.
• First, why is it forbidden to use "empirical curves" to fit the distributions? This notion
9
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which is not specified, probably refers to the non-parametric fit which can be used, avoiding
the price to pay with analytical forms. It is a pity not inciting practitioners to use this
technique because it is well known by modelers that non-parametric fittings when they are
correctly conducted, provides better fits than any parametric distributions and is generally
used as a benchmark.
• Second, it is difficult to understand - from a parametric point of view - why the regulators
focus on the limited list of distributions and why they consider them "at the same level"
knowing that they have specific behaviors which cannot take into account all the features
of the risks, and also knowing that the methodologies to fit them are so different. On the
other hand, this list cannot be exhaustive as there exist other classes of distributions (quite
common) useful to fit these kinds of risks and the regulatory paper does not make any
reference to them assuming that a good fit would be found anyway using the distributions
enumerated. The approach is in our opinion far too restrictive.
• As it seems that there is a mis-understanding regarding the foundation of their proposals
concerning this list of distributions, we provide here an alternative and complementary
approach for the choice of the distributions the modelers can use. If we consider the class
of sub-exponential distributions and in particular those listed in the document we can say
that from a probabilistic and statistical point of view, these distributions have very differ-
ent properties. The generalised Pareto distribution belongs to the class of extreme value
distribution and is fitted on data sets selected above a certain threshold. The Weibull
distribution belongs to the class of extreme value distributions through the Theorem of
Fisher-Tippett (Fisher and Tippett (1928)) appearing as the max -distribution for a cer-
tain class of distributions. In practice we will fit this distribution on data sets built from
the original data using block maxima method selecting the maxima inside the original data
set. The other distributions, if they present any interest in risk modelling (what about the
Burr distribution?) will be fitted on the whole sample. In fine, there is a lot of confusion
for the choice of these distributions. It would be more interesting to introduce and classify
correctly the classes of distributions they propose for their use in practice. Indeed, a large
panel of classes of distributions can be considered: the Generalised Hyperbolic (GH) Class
of distributions (Barndorff-Nielsen (1977)), the α-stable distributions (Samorodnitsky and
10
 
Documents de Travail du Centre d'Economie de la Sorbonne - 2015.46
Taqqu (1994)), the g-and h distributions (Hoaglin (1985)) from one hand, and the extreme
value distributions (Weibull, Fréchet, Gumbel), and the GPD distributions on the other
hand. It is important to make a distinction between these two classes of distributions
because the former ones are fitted on the whole sample and the latter ones on some spe-
cific sub-samples which is fundamental in terms of risk management. Note also that the
techniques of estimations differ for all these classes of distributions. Indeed, we use the
whole sample (original data set) to estimate the GH, α-stable and g-and-h distributions,
and maximum likelihood procedures will be used; Hill and Pickand methods are considered
for estimating the parameters of the GPD distributions, and maximum likelihood method
associated with block maxima methodology is used for the extreme value classes of dis-
tributions. The choice of the distributions cannot be split from the difficulty to estimate
its parameters and the underlying information set. For instance the GPD distribution
is very difficult to fit on nearly all data set because of the estimation of the threshold
which is a key parameter for this class of distributions and whose estimate is generally
very unstable. An error in its estimation can create error, distortion and confusion on the
allocation of the capital. It is surprising that the regulators do not take into account these
issues before imposing such distributions. Their proposal is worthy of a Prévert setting
but, unfortunately, does not correspond to a robust approach.
2 - In the same document (page 17, item 24), regulators discuss the choice of risk measure:"risk
measure means a single statistic extracted from the aggregated loss distribution at the desired
confidence level, such as Value at Risk (VaR), or shortfall measures (e.g. Expected Shortfall,
Median Shortfall)".
This definition is particularly limitative. How the risk measures computed for different factors
with different levels can be aggregated? Does the regulator has in mind the use of a spectral
measure, then how can we use it? This would be interesting but the concept has never been
discussed in any regulatory document. Thus, how robust is the method proposed?
1.3 To summarise
While these documents are addressing the main issues, we believe that some documents are
too prescriptive, preventing banks from going beyond the proposals and focusing more on the
11
 
Documents de Travail du Centre d'Economie de la Sorbonne - 2015.46
capital calculations than the risk management itself. Regarding the calculation of the capital
requirement from the knowledge of the risk factors, the main points concerns the choice of the
distribution, the choice of the risk measure and the choice of p. The regulator would like to
impose some choices. In the previous subsection these ones and the strategies to evaluate the
risks independently from each other are questioned. Consequently, in the following we discuss
the distributions suggested in the regulatory documents to model the risks and we analyse the
soundness of the risk measures and a priori confidence levels associated to these ones.
2 Alternative strategies to the regulatory papers
In the previous Section, the methodological choices implied by the regulation have been pre-
sented and discussed, focusing on the nature of the distributions used to characterise a risk, the
type of risk measure and the dependence structure to be applied. We point out some confusion
and mis-understanding concerning the proposals of the regulators for these very technical points
which are fundamental for the risk management of a banking institution as soon as these choices
are determinant in the computation of the capital requirements, i.e. these should be risk sensi-
tive. Thus, in this Section, using some data sets we illustrate and highlight the impact of these
choices on practitioners10 perceptions of a risk.
2.1 Data set and strategy
We have selected a data set provided by a Tier European bank representing "Execution, Delivery
and Process Management" risks from 2009 to 2013. "Execution, Delivery and Process Manage-
ment" risk is a sub-category of operational risk. This data set is characterized by a distribution
right skewed (positive skewness) and leptokurtic.
In order to follow regulators’ requirements in their different guidelines, we choose to fit on this
data set some of the distributions proposed inside the regulatory documents and also others
which seem more appropriate regarding the properties of the data set. We retain seven distribu-
10Academics, Risk Managers or Authorities
12
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tions. They are estimated (i) on the whole sample: the lognormal distribution (asymmetric and
medium tailed), the Weibull distribution (asymmetric and thin tailed), a Generalised Hyperbolic
(GH) distribution (symetric or asymmetric, fat tailed on an infinite support), an Alpha-Stable
distribution (symmetric, fat tailed on an infinite support), a Generalised Extreme value (GEV)
distribution (asymmetric and fat tailed), (ii) on an adequate subset: the Generalised Pareto
(GPD) distribution (asymmetric, fat tailed) calibrated on a set built over a threshold, a Gener-
alised Extreme value (GEVbm) distribution (asymmetric and fat tailed ) fitted using maxima
coming from the original set. The whole data set contains 98082 data points, the sub-sample
used to fit the GPD contains 2943 data points and the sub-sample used to fit the GEV using the
block maxima approach contains 3924 data points. The objective of these choices is to evaluate
the impact of the selected distributions on the risk representation, i.e. how the initial empirical
exposures are captured and transformed by the model.
Table 1 exhibits parameters’ estimates for each distribution selected11. The parameters are esti-
mated by maximum likelihood, except for the GPD which implied a POT (Guégan et al. (2011))
approach and the GEV fitted on the maxima of the data set (maxima obtained using a block
maxima method (Gnedenko (1943))). The quality of the adjustment is measured using both the
Kolmogorov-Smirnov and the Anderson-Darling tests. The results presented in Table 1 show
that none of the distribution is adequate. This is usually the case when fitting unimodal distri-
butions to multimodal data set. Indeed, multimodality of the distributions is a frequent issue
modelling operational risks as the risk categories combine multiple kinds of incident, for instance,
a category combining external fraud will contain the fraud card on the body, commercial paper
fraud in the middle, cyber attack and Ponzi scheme in the tail. This comes back to an issue we
have discussed previously, where empirical distributions would be more appropriate than fitted
analytical distributions as it may help capturing multimodality. Unfortunately this solution
has been crossed out by regulators as this solution is considered not being able to capture the
tail properly. The use of fitted analytical distributions has been preferred despite the fact that
sometimes no proper fit can be found and the combination of multiple distributions may lead
to a high number of parameters and consequently to even more unstable results. Nevertheless
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the question of multi-modality becomes more and more important concerning the fitting of any
data set. In this paper we do not discuss this issue in more details as it is out of the scope
of our objective as the regulators never suggest this approach: we provide some discussion on
this methodological aspect of risk modelling in the conclusion (some references are for instance,
Wang (2000) or Guégan and Hassani (2015a)).
Using this data set and the fit of the seven distributions, we compute for each distribution the
associated VaRp and ESp for different values of p: the results are provided in Table 3. Then,
in order to consider the question of sub-additivity and the competition between VaRp and ESp
when we have more than one risk factor we show the impact of the choice of the distributions
on the computation respectively of the VaRp(X +Y ) and VaRp(X) + VaRp(Y ) where X and Y
are two risk factors. In this exercise, we compute the previous quantities in the following way:
• As VaRp(X) is a quantile, p ∈ [0, 1], we can build the whole spectrum of the VaR, i.e. the
inverse of the cumulative distribution function. Summing VaRp(X) and VaRp(Y ) for each
value of p provides us with VaRp(X) + VaRp(Y ).
• To obtain VaRp(X+Y ), another approach is adopted. In a first step we randomly generate
X and Y using the distribution fitted previously. Then X and Y are aggregated. The
resulting cumulative distribution function is built and its inverse provide the spectrum of
VaRp(X + Y ).
The results are provided in the Tables 4 to 15. We also illustrate these last results by graphes:
they are given in Figures 1 to 7. We analyse now the results of these tables and Figures.
2.2 VaR
In this Section we analyse the results presented in Table 3 which provides the values obtained for
the VaRp and the ESp computed from the seven distributions fitted on the data set or some sub-
samples, and also of Tables 4 to 15 which permit to address the property of non sub-additivity
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First and foremost, from Table 2, we can see that, p given, the choice of the distribution has a
tremendous impact on the value of the risk measure, i.e. if a lognormal distribution is used, then
the 99% VaR is equal to 3 039, while it is 22 for a Weibul adjusted on the same data and 84 522
using a GPD. A corollary is that the 90% VaR of the GPD is much higher than all the 99% VaR
calculated with any other distribution. A first conclusion would be, what is the point of impos-
ing a percentile if the practitioners are free to use any distribution (c.f. Operational Risk AMA)?
Second, given p, between the four distributions fitted on the whole sample (for instance lognor-
mal, Weibull, GH and alpha-stable), compared to the GPD fitted above a threshold, we observe
a huge difference for the VaR. A change in the threshold may either give higher or lower values
depending, therefore the VaR is highly sensitive to the value of the threshold. Now, comparing
the result obtained on the GEV fitted on the whole sample to the GEV fitted on the bock
maxima, we observe the one focusing on the tails (GEV block maxima) leads to lower VaRs
than a GEV capturing the entire set of information. Therefore, a more conservative information
set associated to the appropriate distribution may lead to a lower VaR. The number of blocks
considered may have some impact but nothing comparable to the effect of the threshold on a
GPD. The Weibull which is a distribution contained in the GEV provides the lowest VaR.
Table 3 exhibits the risk measures obtained from fully correlated random variables. It is inter-
esting to note that the risk measures obtained on fully correlated random variables and the sum
of the risk measures obtained univariately are really similar. This means that as soon as we sum
the VaR obtained on two variables we mechanically assume an upper tailed correlation for the
random variables. Therefore, besides of being conservative the sum of univariate VaRs taken
at the same level prevents the capture of any diversification benefit. Fully correlated random
variables do not embed any diversification benefit by definition. Consequently, the analysis re-
garding the sub-additivity of the risk measures have to be performed in another way.
So, as presented earlier, we randomly generated values from the distribution fitted before and
combined them two by two. By way of this process we generated some random correlations
and as a matter of fact some diversification. Then, we compared the risk measures obtained
from the combination of random variables and the sum of the risk measures computed on the
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random variables taken independently. Figures 1 to 5 represents the spectra of these two items
and consequently allows comparing the risk measure obtained for different confidence levels.
These figures show that depending on the combinations of distributions, the VaR may always be
sub-additive, never sub-additive, only sub-additive in the tails, only sub-additive in the body or
may be more erratic, i.e. can be sub-additive initially, then become non-sub-additive, and finally
become sub-additive again in the tails. These observations are supported by Tables 12 to 14.
Tables 14 also show the impact of the discretisation of the distributions on the risk measures,
as this impact the sub-additivity. This last property is not only associated to the choice of the
risk measure but definitively to the choice of the distribution and of the confidence level?
Analysing the results in details, we see in Table 4, for p fixed, that the VaR is never sub-additive
if the lognormal distribution is associated to a GPD, while if the lognormal distribution is asso-
ciated to any of the others, the VaR is usually sub-additive in the tails but not at the end of the
body part. Note that if the lognormal is associated with an identical lognormal, the differences
we have observed are only due to numerical errors related to the sampling. We expect the two
values to be absolutely identical. Though, it is interesting to note that the random generation
of numbers can be the root cause of non sub-additive results. Identical analysis can be done
on other combinations (see table 6). Looking at Table 6 it appears that when the GPD has
a positive location parameter, this prevents any combination from being sub-additive, because
by construction the 0th percentile of the GPD is equal to the location parameter which should
be according to Pickand’s theorem (Pickands (1975)), sufficiently high. At the 95th percentile,
the VaR is always sub-additive as soon as a lognormal distribution is involved except if it is
combined with a GPD. For the other distributions, it is not always true. For example, the VaR
obtained combining a Weibull and a GEV fitted on the whole sample is not sub-additive. Table
7 shows that the use of an Alpha-Stable combined with any other distribution except the GPD
provides sub-additive risk measures at the 99% level.
In Parallel, Figures 1 to 5 allows a more discriminating analysis of the behaviour of the compo-
nent V aRp(X + Y ) versus V aRp(X) + V aRp(Y ). In Figure 1, we show that the sub-additivity
property is only verified for high percentile when we use a combination of a Weibull and a GH
distributions, i.e. for p > 90%. Besides, the gap tends to enlarge as the percentiles increase.
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Figure 2 exhibits a non sub-additive VaR from the 95th percentile, when we use the combi-
nation of an Alpha-Stable distribution and a GEV fitted with the block maxima method, but
the differences are not as large as on Figure 1. Figure 3 shows that combining two identical
distributions does not always produce sub-additive risk measures though it should always be the
case: this can be due to numerical errors engendered by the random generation of data points
and the discretisation of the distribution. On Figure 4 and 5 we observe that the VaRs obtained
from the combination of an Alpha-Stable distribution and a GH distribution or an Alpha-stable
distribution and a GEV calibrated on maxima are never sub-additive below 70% . For com-
parison purposes, Figures 6 and 7 illustrate that the combination of two elliptical distributions
(respectively the Gaussian and the Student-t distributions) always leads to sub-additive VaRs.
2.3 Expected Shortfall
In this Section the results of the Table 3 are analysed. It provides the values obtained for the
VaRp and the ESp computed from the seven distributions fitted on the data set or some sub-
samples, and also of the Tables 4 to 15 which permit to verify the sub-addivity property of the
ES risk measure.
The ES calculations are linked to the distribution used to model the underlying risks. Looking
at Table 2, at the 95%, we observe that the ES goes from 18 for the Weibull to 216 127 for
the GPD. Therefore, depending on the distribution used to model the same risk, at the same p
level, the ES obtained is completely different. The corollary of that issue is that the ES obtained
for a given distribution at a lower percentile will be higher than the ES computed on another
distribution at a higher percentile. For example, Table 2 show that the 90% ES obtained from
an Alpha-Stable distribution is much higher than the 99.9% ES computed on a lognormal dis-
tribution.
The comments regarding the impact of the choice of the information sets on the calculation of
the considered risk measure are identical to those stated in the third paragraph of the previous
section except regarding 2 points. First, results obtained from the GPD and the alpha-stable
distribution are of the same order. Second, the differences between the GPD and the GEV
fitted on the block maxima are huge, illustrating the fact that despite being two extreme value
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distributions, the information captured is quite different.
Regarding the sub-additivity issue, by building the ES always lead to sub-additive values, con-
trary to the VaR for which this property is not always verified and depends on the underlying
distribution. It is interesting to note that if we combine two ES taken at two different levels of
confidence p, the ES may not be sub-additive anymore. This is a point that the regulator does
not discuss when he says that we have to aggregate the risk measures. This issue is particu-
larly important for risk managers, as soon as the level of confidence prescribed in the regulation
guidelines is different from a risk factor to another and appears totally arbitrary.
While the use of several confidence levels pi, i = 1, · · · , k allowing to have a spectral represen-
tation of the risk measure (VaR or ES) could be interesting but the approach proposed by the
regulator which mixes distribution and confidence level is questionable. Indeed, the 70% ES
of some combinations may lead to much higher value that the 99.9th (Table 9, WE-GPD vs
WE-GH).
2.4 VaR vs Expected Shortfall
Previously we illustrate the fact that, depending on the distribution used and the confidence
level chosen, the values provided by VaRp can be bigger than the values derived for an ESp and
conversely. Thus a question arises: What should we use the VaR or the Expected Shortfall? To
answer to this question we can consider several points:
• Conservativeness: Regarding that point, the choice of the risk measure is only relevant
for a given distribution, i.e. for any given distribution the VaRp will always be inferior
to the ESp (assuming only positive values) for a given p. But, if the distribution used to
characterise the risk is to be chosen and fitted, then it may happen that for a given level
p, the VaRp obtained from a distribution is superior to the ESp. For example Table 2
shows that the 99.9% VaR obtained using the GEV distribution fitted with block maxima
is superior to the ES obtained for any other distribution at the same level p.
• Sub-additivity: In that case only the expected shortfall guarantees always the sub-additivity
of the measure as soon as the p is set, but for some distributions the VaR can be also sub-
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additive.
• Distribution and p impacts: Table 2 shows that potentially a 90% level ES obtained on a
given distribution is larger than a 99.9% VaR obtained on another distribution, e.g. the ES
obtained from a GH distribution at 90% is higher that the VaR obtained form a lognormal
distribution at 97.5%. Thus is it always pertinent to use a high value for p?
• Parameterisation and estimation: the impact of the calibration of the estimates of the
parameters is not negligible (Guégan et al. (2011)), mainly when we fit a GPD. Indeed in
that latter case, due to the instability of the estimates for the threshold, the practitioners
can largely overfit the risks. Thus, why the regulators still impose this distribution?
3 Conclusion and Recommendations
In the introduction, analysing several guidelines issued by the EBA and the Basel Committee,
we pointed out the fact that the regulators impose specific distributions, risk measures and con-
fidence levels to analyse the risk factors in order to evaluate the capital requirements of financial
institutions. It appears that their approach is non holistic and their analysis of the risks relies
on a disconnection between the choice of the distributions, the risk measures and the confidence
level, tools necessary for risks assessments.
In this paper we show that the risk measurement for financial institutions depends intrinsically
on how the tools are chosen, i.e. the distribution, the combinations of these distributions, the
type of risk measure and the level of confidence. Therefore, the existence of a risk measure as
discussed in the regulation is questionable, as for example modifying the level of confidence by a
few percents would result in completely different interpretations. The regulators fail to propose
an appropriate approach to measure these risks in financial institutions as soon as they do not
take into account the problem of risk modelling in its globality.
Regulators are by far too prescriptive and their choices questionable:
• Imposing distributions makes no sense whatever the risks to be modeled. Where are these
a priori coming from?
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• The regulation reflect some misunderstanding of distributions’ properties (probabilist ap-
proach) and of the particular properties surrounding their fitting (statistical approach).
• The levels of confidence p seems rather arbitrary. They neither take into account the
flexibility of risk measures nor the impact of the underlying distribution, misleading risk
managers.
While these fundamental problems are not addressed, others are completely ignored such as the
concept of spectral analysis, or of distortion risk measures (Sereda et al. (2010), Guégan and
Hassani (2015a)). Despite the cosmetic changes included in Basel II and III, the propositions
do not enable a better risk management, and banks response to regulatory points are not ap-
propriate as they do not correspond to the reality. It is therefore not surprising that capital
calculations and stress testing are still unclear, and that these are not able to capture asymmet-
ric chocs corresponding an extreme incident (black swan, dinosaur or dragon).
Some other questions should also be addressed:
• Is that more efficient in terms of risk management to measure the risk and then build a
capital buffer or to adjust the risk taken considering the capital we have? In other word,
maybe should banks start optimising their income generation with respect to the capital
they already have.
• The previous points are all based on unimodal parametric distributions to characterise
each risk factor, what is the impact of using multimodal distributions in terms of risk
measurement and management? We believe that an empirical evaluation of the risk pro-
vides bank with a reliable benchmark and a starting point in term of what would be an
acceptable capital charge or risk assessment.
• One of the biggest issue lies in the fact that we do not know how to combine or aggregate
V aR(X)p1 , V aR(Y )p2 and V aR(Z)p3 evaluated on three different kinds of risks at three
different confidence level p1, p2, p3. This mechanically prevents banks from building a
holistic approach from a capital point of view. How should we proceed to solve the problem,
should we use p = max(p1, p2, p3), or the min or the average?
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• While in this paper we focused on each factor taken independently, the question of the
dependence is quite important too. Maybe not as important as the impact of the distri-
bution selected for the risk factor (Guégan and Hassani (2013a)) but non addressing this
issue properly could lead to a mis-interpretation of the results. The choice of the copula
has a direct impact on the dependence structure we would like to apply and the capture of
shocks. For instance, a Gaussian or Student t-copula is symmetric, despite the fact that a
t-copula with a low number of degrees of freedom could capture tail dependencies, these
would not capture asymmetric shocks. Archimedean or Extrema Value copulas associated
to a vines strategy would be more appropriate (Guégan and Maugis (2010)).
• In a situation such as depicted by a stress-testing process with forward looking perspective,
if the risks are not correctly measured then the foundations will be very fragile and the
outcome of the exercise not reliable. Indeed, stressing a situation requires an appropriate
initial assessment of the real exposure, otherwise the stress would merely model what
should have been captured originally and therefore be useless (Bensoussan et al. (2015),
Guégan and Hassani (2015b), Hassani (2015)).
We came up to the conclusion that the debate related to the selection of a risk measure over
another is not really relevant, and considering issues raised in the previous sections our main
recommendation would be to leave as much flexibility as possible to the modellers to build
the most appropriate models for risk management purposes initially and then extended with
conservative buffers for capital purposes. The idea would be to bring the idea that a good
risk management would mechanically limit the exposure and the losses and therefore ultimately
reduce the regulatory capital burden. Models should only be a reflexion of the underlying risk
framework and not a tool to justify a reduced capital charge. We would like to see more the
supervisory face of the authorities and less their regulatory one, in other words we would like
them to stop focusing so much on banks risk measurement comparability and more on financial
institutions risk understanding. It would probably be wise if both regulators and risk managers
were working together (e.g., academic formation open to both corpus, regular workshops, etc.,
(Guégan (2009))) instead as opponents in order to reach their objective of stability of the financial
system for the first and profitability for the second.
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Figure 1: This plot represents the sum of VaR(X) and VaR(Y) (red) versus VaR(X + Y) (black).
The random variable X has been generated using a Weibull distribution and Y has been obtained
from a Generalised Hyberbolic distribution. The percentiles represented are the 70th, 80th, 90th,
95th, 99th, 99.5th and 99.9th. For high percentiles, the VaR seems to be sub-additive.
















Figure 2: This plot represents the sum of VaR(X) and VaR(Y) (red) versus VaR(X + Y) (black).
The random variable X has been generated using a Alpha-stable distribution and Y has been
obtained from a GEV distribution calibrated on maxima. The percentile represented are the
70th, 80th, 90th, 95th, 99th, 99.5th and 99.9th. For high percentiles, the VaR is not sub-additive.
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Figure 3: This plot represents the sum of VaR(X) and VaR(Y) (red) versus VaR(X + Y) (black).
The random variables X and Y have been obtained from two identical GEV distributions. The
percentiles represented are the 70th, 80th, 90th, 95th, 99th, 99.5th and 99.9th. For high per-
centiles, the VaR is sub-additive.





















Figure 4: This plot represents the sum of VaR(X) and VaR(Y) (red) versus VaR(X + Y)
(black). The random variable X has been generated using a Alpha-stable distribution and Y
has been obtained from a Generalised Hyperbolic distribution. The percentiles represented are
sequentially going from the 10th to the 70th with a step of 1% between two points. The VaR
represented are never sub-additive.
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Figure 5: This plot represents the sum of VaR(X) and VaR(Y) (red) versus VaR(X + Y)
(black). The random variable X has been generated using a Alpha-stable distribution and Y has
been obtained from a GEV distribution calibrated on maxima. The percentiles represented are
sequentially going from the 10th to the 70th with a step of 1% between two points. The VaR
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Figure 6: This plot represents the sum of VaR(X) and VaR(Y) (doted line) versus VaR(X +
Y) (solid line). The random variable X has been generated using a Gaussian distribution (0, 1)
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Figure 7: This plot represents the sum of VaR(X) and VaR(Y) (doted line) versus VaR(X + Y)
(solid line). The random variable X has been generated using a Student-t distribution (3 df)
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LN-LN 1 393 663 1, 373 2, 503 7, 721 11, 661 27, 292
LN-LN 2 395 667 1, 376 2, 503 7, 721 11, 677 27, 517
LN-WE 1 447 742 1, 439 2, 427 6, 299 8, 924 18, 498
LN-WE 2 564 826 1, 374 2, 068 4, 654 6, 406 14, 066
LN-GPD 1 4, 321 6, 181 11, 432 21, 158 88, 382 163, 788 689, 569
LN-GPD 2 58, 968 60, 766 65, 759 74, 945 138, 510 209, 859 726, 643
LN-GH 1 364 611 1, 313 2, 569 9, 882 16, 037 41, 329
LN-GH 2 480 742 1, 418 2, 528 8, 205 12, 765 30, 592
LN-AS 1 377 614 1, 269 2, 461 10, 965 21, 402 111, 987
LN-AS 2 476 725 1, 374 2, 472 9, 657 18, 319 101, 929
LN-GV 1 25, 132 137, 464 2, 097, 977 28, 700, 959 10.73e9 134.51e9 47, 029e9
LN-GV 2 25, 313 138, 221 2, 095, 098 29, 156, 891 10.47e9 135.38e9 45, 501e9
LN-GVb 1 366 614 1, 312 2, 579 11, 037 20, 542 91, 109
LN-GVb 2 481 742 1, 423 2, 571 9, 670 17, 603 80, 694
Table 4: The sum of VaR(X) and VaR(Y) (line 1) versus VaR(X + Y) (line 2) for couple of
distributions: LN = lognormal, WE = Weibull, GPD = Generalised Pareto, GH = Generalised
Hyperbolic, AS = Alpha-Stable, GV = Generalised Extreme Value, GVB = Generalised Extreme
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WE-WE 1 501 820 1, 505 2, 352 4, 878 6, 187 9, 703
WE-WE 2 501 821 1, 510 2, 352 4, 879 6, 185 9, 807
WE-GPD 1 4, 376 6, 259 11, 498 21, 082 86, 961 161, 051 680, 774
WE-GPD 2 58, 916 60, 639 65, 520 74, 662 138, 368 209, 701 726, 035
WE-GH 1 418 690 1, 379 2, 494 8, 460 13, 300 32, 534
WE-GH 2 533 795 1, 379 2, 208 6, 472 10, 534 27, 998
WE-AS 1 431 692 1, 335 2, 386 9, 544 18, 665 103, 193
WE-AS 2 528 779 1, 341 2, 148 7, 556 16, 025 101, 095
WE-GV 1 25, 186 137, 542 2, 098, 044 28, 700, 884 10.73e9 134.51e9 47, 029e9
WE-GV 2 25, 197 138, 107 2, 094, 946 29, 156, 852 10.47e9 135.38e9 45, 501e9
WE-GVb 1 420 692 1, 379 2, 504 9, 616 17, 805 82, 315
WE-GVb 2 534 796 1, 381 2, 237 7, 710 15, 281 79, 250
Table 5: The sum of VaR(X) and VaR(Y) (line 1) versus VaR(X + Y) (line 2) for couple of
distributions: LN = lognormal, WE = Weibull, GPD = Generalised Pareto, GH = Generalised
Hyperbolic, AS = Alpha-Stable, GV = Generalised Extreme Value, GVB = Generalised Extreme
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GPD-GPD 1 8, 250 11, 699 21, 490 39, 812 169, 044 315, 915 1, 351, 846
GPD-GPD 2 117, 080 120, 546 130, 394 148, 749 276, 271 418, 831 1, 452, 006
GPD-GH 1 4, 292 6, 129 11, 372 21, 224 90, 543 168, 164 703, 606
GPD-GH 2 59, 005 60, 888 66, 096 75, 538 139, 002 209, 869 726, 103
GPD-AS 1 4, 305 6, 131 11, 328 21, 116 91, 627 173, 528 774, 264
GPD-AS 2 58, 987 60, 890 66, 273 76, 314 147, 644 229, 984 834, 971
GPD-GV 1 29, 061 142, 981 2, 108, 036 28, 719, 614 10.73e9 134.51e9 47, 029e9
GPD-GV 2 92, 215 210, 767 2, 181, 852 29, 254, 626 10.47e9 135.38e9 45, 501e9
GPD-GVb 1 4, 292 6, 129 11, 372 21, 224 90, 543 168, 164 703, 606
GPD-GVb 2 59, 005 60, 888 66, 096 75, 538 139, 002 209, 869 726, 103
GH-GH 1 335 559 1, 253 2, 635 12, 043 20, 413 55, 366
GH-GH 2 335 559 1, 253 2, 635 12, 043 20, 413 55, 366
GH-AS 1 348 562 1, 209 2, 527 13, 126 25, 778 126, 024
GH-AS 2 442 683 1, 393 2, 778 12, 596 23, 446 104, 497
GH-GV 1 25, 103 137, 412 2, 097, 918 28, 701, 025 10.73e9 134.51e9 47, 029e9
GH-GV 2 25, 635 138, 429 2, 095, 206 29, 157, 735 10.47e9 135.38e9 45, 501e9
GH-GVb 1 336 562 1, 252 2, 645 13, 198 24, 917 105, 146
GH-GVb 2 446 703 1, 451 2, 895 12, 502 22, 224 84, 680
Table 6: The sum of VaR(X) and VaR(Y) (line 1) versus VaR(X + Y) (line 2) for couple of
distributions: LN = lognormal, WE = Weibull, GPD = Generalised Pareto, GH = Generalised
Hyperbolic, AS = Alpha-Stable, GV = Generalised Extreme Value, GVB = Generalised Extreme
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AS-AS 1 361 564 1, 165 2, 419 14, 210 31, 142 196, 682
AS-AS 2 360 562 1, 159 2, 428 14, 153 31, 459 201, 447
AS-GV 1 25, 116 137, 414 2, 097, 873 28, 700, 918 10.73e9 134.51e9 47, 029e9
AS-GV 2 26, 139 140, 091 2, 099, 977 29, 175, 188 10.47e9 135.38e9 45, 501e9
AS-GVb 1 349 564 1, 208 2, 537 14, 282 30, 282 175, 804
AS-GVb 2 443 683 1, 399 2, 849 15, 645 33, 285 189, 589
GV-GV 1 49, 871 274, 264 4, 194, 582 57, 399, 416 21.46e9 269e9 94, 058e9
GV-GV 2 49, 844 275, 821 4, 189, 583 58, 313, 419 20.94e9 271e9 91, 002e9
GV-GVb 1 25, 105 137, 414 2, 097, 917 28, 701, 036 10.73e9 134.51e9 47, 029e9
GV-GVb 2 26, 105 139, 855 2, 099, 195 29, 174, 309 10.47e9 135.38e9 45, 501e9
GVb-GVb 1 338 564 1, 252 2, 656 14, 353 29, 422 154, 927
GVb-GVb 2 340 565 1, 251 2, 663 14, 609 29, 967 158, 273
Table 7: The sum of VaR(X) and VaR(Y) (line 1) versus VaR(X + Y) (line 2) for couple of
distributions: LN = lognormal, WE = Weibull, GPD = Generalised Pareto, GH = Generalised
Hyperbolic, AS = Alpha-Stable, GV = Generalised Extreme Value, GVB = Generalised Extreme
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LN-LN 1 1, 895 2, 587 4, 226 6, 616 16, 572 23, 652 50, 725
LN-LN 2 1, 895 2, 587 4, 226 6, 616 16, 572 23, 652 50, 725
LN-WE 1 1, 727 2, 302 3, 574 5, 293 11, 739 16, 021 31, 500
LN-WE 2 1, 541 1, 970 2, 882 4, 092 8, 841 12, 269 25, 675
LN-GPD 1 87, 496 101, 478 140, 329 211, 059 682, 080 1, 191, 608 4, 513, 150
LN-GPD 2 87, 065 100, 726 138, 767 208, 277 674, 213 1, 180, 157 4, 488, 157
LN-GH 1 2, 146 2, 984 5, 081 8, 347 23, 114 33, 777 71, 406
LN-GH 2 1, 996 2, 698 4, 383 6, 898 17, 681 25, 214 50, 397
LN-AS 1 16, 694 24, 801 48, 732 95, 726 459, 981 905, 044 4, 350, 967
LN-AS 2 16, 545 24, 525 48, 067 94, 322 454, 147 895, 398 4, 326, 497
LN-GV 1 8e18 12e18 24e18 48e18 244e18 489e18 2, 447e18
LN-GV 2 8e18 12e18 24e18 48e18 244e18 489e18 2, 447e18
LN-GVb 1 5, 608 8, 174 15, 460 29, 105 126, 073 237, 314 1, 032, 332
LN-GVb 2 5, 457 7, 888 14, 762 27, 640 120, 229 227, 765 1, 008, 148
Table 8: The sum of ES(X) and ES(Y) (line 1) versus ES(X + Y) (line 2) for couple of dis-
tributions: LN = lognormal, WE = Weibull, GPD = Generalised Pareto, GH = Generalised
Hyperbolic, AS = Alpha-Stable, GV = Generalised Extreme Value, GVB = Generalised Ex-
treme Value calibrated on maxima. The percentiles represented are the 70th, 80th, 90th, 95th,
99th, 99.5th and 99.9th.
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WE-WE 1 1, 559 2, 016 2, 921 3, 970 6, 905 8, 390 12, 276
WE-WE 2 1, 559 2, 016 2, 921 3, 970 6, 905 8, 390 12, 276
WE-GPD 1 87, 328 101, 193 139, 676 209, 736 677, 247 1, 183, 977 4, 493, 926
WE-GPD 2 86, 887 100, 505 138, 515 208, 044 674, 087 1, 180, 072 4, 488, 101
WE-GH 1 1, 978 2, 698 4, 428 7, 024 18, 280 26, 146 52, 182
WE-GH 2 1, 810 2, 389 3, 739 5, 758 15, 192 22, 257 46, 312
WE-AS 1 16, 526 24, 516 48, 079 94, 403 455, 148 897, 413 4, 331, 742
WE-AS 2 16, 359 24, 217 47, 423 93, 172 452, 023 893, 523 4, 325, 897
WE-GV 1 8e18 12e18 24e18 48e18 244e18 489e18 2447e18
WE-GV 2 8e18 12e18 24e18 48e18 244e18 489e18 2447e18
WE-GVb 1 5, 440 7, 889 14, 807 27, 782 121, 240 229, 683 1, 013, 108
WE-GVb 2 5, 270 7, 579 14, 119 26, 506 118, 106 225, 770 1, 007, 256
Table 9: The sum of ES(X) and ES(Y) (line 1) versus ES(X + Y) (line 2) for couple of dis-
tributions: LN = lognormal, WE = Weibull, GPD = Generalised Pareto, GH = Generalised
Hyperbolic, AS = Alpha-Stable, GV = Generalised Extreme Value, GVB = Generalised Ex-
treme Value calibrated on maxima. The percentiles represented are the 70th, 80th, 90th, 95th,
99th, 99.5th and 99.9th.
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GPD-GPD 1 173, 097 200, 369 276, 431 415, 503 1, 347, 588 2, 359, 564 8, 975, 575
GPD-GPD 2 173, 097 200, 369 276, 431 415, 503 1, 347, 588 2, 359, 564 8, 975, 575
GPD-GH 1 87, 747 101, 874 141, 183 212, 791 688, 622 1, 201, 732 4, 533, 832
GPD-GH 2 87, 330 101, 092 139, 298 208, 887 674, 421 1, 180, 208 4, 488, 112
GPD-AS 1 102, 295 123, 692 184, 834 300, 169 1, 125, 489 2, 073, 000 8, 813, 392
GPD-AS 2 101, 891 122, 938 182, 933 295, 782 1, 098, 582 2, 016, 042 8, 499, 442
GPD-GV 1 8e18 12e18 24e18 48e18 244e18 489e18 2, 447e18
GPD-GV 2 8e18 12e18 24e18 48e18 244e18 489e18 2, 447e18
GPD-GVb 1 91, 209 107, 065 151, 562 233, 548 791, 581 1, 405, 270 5, 494, 758
GPD-GVb 2 90, 787 106, 267 149, 558 229, 042 766, 781 1, 355, 085 5, 243, 081
GH-GH 1 2, 397 3, 380 5, 935 10, 078 29, 655 43, 901 92, 088
GH-GH 2 2, 397 3, 380 5, 935 10, 078 29, 655 43, 901 92, 088
GH-AS 1 16, 945 25, 197 49, 586 97, 457 466, 523 915, 168 4, 371, 648
GH-AS 2 16, 809 24, 941 48, 924 95, 926 458, 199 899, 741 4, 327, 096
GH-GV 1 8e18 12e18 24e18 48e18 244e18 489e18 2, 447e18
GH-GV 2 8e18 12e18 24e18 48e18 244e18 489e18 2, 447e18
GH-GVb 1 5, 858 8, 571 16, 314 30, 836 132, 615 247, 439 1, 053, 014
GH-GVb 2 5, 722 8, 305 15, 616 29, 227 124, 294 232, 340 1, 009, 422
Table 10: The sum of ES(X) and ES(Y) (line 1) versus ES(X + Y) (line 2) for couple of
distributions: LN = lognormal, WE = Weibull, GPD = Generalised Pareto, GH = Generalised
Hyperbolic, AS = Alpha-Stable, GV = Generalised Extreme Value, GVB = Generalised Extreme
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AS-AS 1 31, 493 47, 015 93, 237 184, 836 903, 390 1, 786, 436 8, 651, 209
AS-AS 2 31, 493 47, 015 93, 237 184, 836 903, 390 1, 786, 436 8, 651, 209
AS-GV 1 8e18 12e18 24e18 48e18 244e18 489e18 2, 447e18
AS-GV 2 8e18 12e18 24e18 48e18 244e18 489e18 2, 447e18
AS-GVb 1 20, 406 30, 388 59, 965 118, 215 569, 482 1, 118, 706 5, 332, 574
AS-GVb 2 20, 270 30, 130 59, 302 116, 655 559, 704 1, 097, 691 5, 212, 237
GV-GV 1 16e18 24e18 48e18 97e18 489e18 979e18 4, 895e18
GV-GV 2 16e18 24e18 48e18 97e18 489e18 979e18 4, 895e18
GV-GVb 1 8e18 12e18 24e18 48e18 244e18 489e18 2, 447e18
GV-GVb 2 8e18 12e18 24e18 48e18 244e18 489e18 2, 447e18
GVb-GVb 1 9, 320 13, 761 26, 693 51, 593 235, 574 450, 977 2, 013, 940
GVb-GVb 2 9, 320 13, 761 26, 693 51, 593 235, 574 450, 977 2, 013, 940
Table 11: The sum of ES(X) and ES(Y) (line 1) versus ES(X + Y) (line 2) for couple of
distributions: LN = lognormal, WE = Weibull, GPD = Generalised Pareto, GH = Generalised
Hyperbolic, AS = Alpha-Stable, GV = Generalised Extreme Value, GVB = Generalised Extreme
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80.00% 81.00% 82.00% 83.00% 84.00% 85.00% 86.00% 87.00%
-81.843 -74.943 -66.539 -57.410 -47.461 -35.212 -20.496 -3.984
88.00% 89.00% 90.00% 91.00% 92.00% 93.00% 94.00% 95.00%
16.247 40.129 67.997 102.443 144.756 196.882 266.676 360.135
96.00% 97.00% 98.00% 99.00% 99.50% 99.90% 99.95% 99.99%
489.356 677.618 1, 011.196 1, 696.400 2, 581.672 4, 858.396 5, 761.766 10, 964.930
Table 12: This table shows the differences between the sum VaR(X) and the VaR(Y) and the
VaR(X + Y). The random variable X has been generated using a Weibull and Y has been
obtained from a lognormal distribution. When the values are positive, the VaR is sub-additive,
when the values are negative the VaR is not. The turning points are highlighted in bold.
80.00% 81.00% 82.00% 83.00% 84.00% 85.00% 86.00% 87.00%
-86.104 -82.891 -80.004 -75.764 -69.887 -63.385 -55.082 -45.380
88.00% 89.00% 90.00% 91.00% 92.00% 93.00% 94.00% 95.00%
-34.810 -21.030 -2.510 23.340 54.970 99.660 159.200 249.830
96.00% 97.00% 98.00% 99.00% 99.50% 99.90% 99.95% 99.99%
393.730 632.630 1, 098.500 2, 170.800 3, 052.900 4, 784.190 17, 905.440 −633, 422.500
Table 13: This table shows the differences between the sum VaR(X) and the VaR(Y) and the
VaR(X + Y). The random variable X has been generated using a Weibull and Y has been
obtained from an Alpha-stable distribution. When the values are positive, the VaR is sub-
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-0.012 0.022 -0.013 -0.018 -0.015 -0.031 -0.020 -0.026
-0.038 0.011 0.028 0.023 0.022 0.024 0.044 0.073
0.074 0.080 0.139 0.144 0.194 0.171 0.167 0.163
0.142 0.141 0.134 0.150 0.179 0.175 0.105 0.107
0.016 -0.001 -0.002 -0.003 0.013 -0.021 -0.048 -0.011
-0.016 0.045 0.074 0.032 0.074 0.166 0.124 0.104
0.098 0.019 -0.037 -0.079 -0.100 -0.120 -0.144 -0.047
-0.070 -0.086 -0.136 -0.234 -0.291 -0.352 -0.272 -0.197
-0.098 0.038 0.121 -0.313 -0.299 -0.483 -0.621 -0.422
-0.457 0.099 0.272 0.381 0.430 0.656 0.754 0.533
0.693 1.035 0.715 1.087 0.778 −0.167 -0.479 -0.522
-0.759 -3.391 -2.265 -4.190 -3.137 -6.484 -1.975 9.502
6.873 16.636 69.495 50.091 7, 118.689 8, 798.144 −148, 979.500 NA
Table 14: This table shows the differences between the sum VaR(X) and the VaR(Y) and the
VaR(X + Y). The random variable X and Y have been obtained on 2 identical GEV distribution.
When the values are positive, the VaR is sub-additive, when the values are negative the VaR
is not. The turning points are highlighted in bold. The percentiles represented are sequentially
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